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QUESTION PRESENTED 
 
Whether FERC reasonably concluded that it has 
authority under the Federal Power Act to regulate 
the rules used by operators of wholesale electricity 
markets to pay for reductions in electricity 
consumption and to recoup those payments through 
adjustments to wholesale rates. 
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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 
 
 Amici curiae are law professors who have 
significant research and teaching experience in the 
field of energy law, with a particular focus on electric 
power markets. They are listed in the Appendix to 
this brief.1  They are submitting this brief because 
they believe that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit made serious errors 
when it held that the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC) lacked authority to regulate 
operators’ rules for demand response (DR) in the 
wholesale electricity markets.  That holding is 
contrary to the text, history, and structure of the 
Federal Power Act (FPA), which mandates that 
FERC must remedy “practices . . . affecting” 
wholesale electricity rates to ensure such rates are 
just and reasonable.   Moreover, it ignores FERC’s 
reasonable interpretation of its statutory authority.  
City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1868 
(2013). Amici direct their arguments to the 
jurisdictional issue only, and take no position on the 
second issue for which this Court has granted 
certiorari.  Cf. Richard J. Pierce Jr., A Primer on 
Demand Response and a Critique of FERC Order 
745, 102 GEO. WASH. U. J. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. 102, 
103 (2011) (revealing complexity of second issue). 
 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Section 201 of the FPA authorizes FERC to 
regulate wholesale sales of electricity in interstate 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1  No person other than the named amici or their counsel 
authored this brief or provided financial support for it.  All 
parties have consented to the filing of this brief. 
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commerce.  16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1).  Further, §§ 205 
and 206 of the Act direct FERC to regulate “practices 
. . . affecting” the rates for such sales if it finds these 
practices are “unjust, unreasonable, unduly 
discriminatory or preferential.”  Id. §§ 824d(a), 
824e(a).  In Order 745, FERC concluded that a 
uniform compensation scheme for DR resources 
bidding into the wholesale markets was necessary to 
ensure that wholesale rates would be just and 
reasonable.  Demand Response Compensation in 
Organized Wholesale Energy Markets, 134 FERC ¶ 
61,187, at ¶ 2 (Mar. 15, 2011) [hereinafter Order 
745].   
 
In support of its determination, FERC 
canvassed the myriad, non-uniform approaches that 
the wholesale electricity markets used for pricing 
DR.  Id. ¶ 14.  The agency also considered 
commenters’ general support for a unified policy, ¶¶ 
43-44, and highlighted the purpose for its 
rulemaking:  “propos[ing] a remedy for current 
compensation levels that inhibited meaningful 
demand-side participation.”  Id. ¶ 1.  FERC explicitly 
exercised its FPA remedial authority in issuing 
Order 745.  Id. ¶ 112.   
 
Respondents petitioned the D.C. Circuit for 
review of Order 745, arguing: (1) FERC lacked 
statutory authority to issue the Order; and (2) even if 
it had such authority, the agency’s exercise thereof 
was arbitrary and capricious.  The D.C. Circuit 
vacated Order 745, ruling in Respondents’ favor on 
both issues.  Elec. Power Supply Ass’n v. FERC, 753 
F.3d 216 (D.C. Cir. 2014).  First, the court 
determined that FERC’s authority could not extend 
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to setting compensation levels for wholesale DR, 
notwithstanding the court’s agreement with FERC 
that “demand response compensation affects the 
wholesale market.”   Id. at 221.  Second, the court 
concluded that the manner in which FERC set DR 
compensation was arbitrary and capricious.     
 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
 
The D.C. Circuit erred in determining that the 
FPA forecloses FERC jurisdiction to set 
compensation levels for DR resources, for two 
reasons.   
 
First, the D.C. Circuit impermissibly 
attempted to rewrite the FPA by failing to give effect 
to FERC’s §§ 205 and 206 remedial authority.  In so 
doing, the court below departed from this Court’s 
longstanding precedent, which provides that FERC 
has jurisdiction to regulate practices affecting 
wholesale rates if those practices render the rates 
unjust and unreasonable, notwithstanding that those 
practices may also impact retail markets. See, e.g., 
FPC v. Conway Corp., 426 U.S. 271, 276-80 (1976).  
The D.C. Circuit also ignored over a century of case 
law elaborating federal regulatory authority over 
“practices . . . affecting” jurisdictional rates.  This 
body of law provides the relevant limiting principle:  
such practices must be directly related or integral to 
the proper functioning of the wholesale markets.  
FERC’s reasonable determination that DR pricing 
bears this direct connection to the wholesale markets 
should be reinstated.  See infra pp. 9-13.    
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Second, the D.C. Circuit devised a wholly new 
and unsupported interpretation of § 201(a) of the 
FPA that has no basis in the statutory text or this 
Court’s jurisprudence.  See Conn. Light & Power Co. 
v. FPC, 324 U.S. 515, 527 (1945)).  The D.C. Circuit 
decided that the precatory language of § 201(a) 
supported an exclusive zone of state regulatory 
authority over matters involving retail rates.  If left 
in place, this novel development would limit FERC’s 
jurisdiction over interstate power markets in 
unprecedented ways and re-open the “Attleboro gap” 
that Congress sought to fill when crafting the FPA.  
Public Util. Comm’n of R.I. v. Attleboro Steam & 
Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83 (1927).  
 
 
ARGUMENT 
 
 
I. FERC Reasonably Determined It Had 
Jurisdiction to Remedy Wholesale 
Market Dysfunctions With Respect to 
DR Pricing. 
 
A. FERC Clearly Invoked Its Remedial 
Authority in Issuing Order 745. 
 
Congress structured the FPA to close a 
regulatory gap by authorizing federal regulation over 
interstate sales of electricity—a regulatory option 
unavailable to the states under the dormant 
Commerce Clause.  See Attleboro, 273 U.S. 83 
(applying constitutional limits to state regulation of 
interstate energy transactions).  In designing the 
FPA, Congress “authorized federal regulation in 
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areas beyond the reach of state power, such as the 
gap identified in Attleboro, [and] it also extended 
federal coverage to some areas that previously had 
been state regulated.”  New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 
1, 6 (2002).   
 
Section 201 of the Act establishes plenary 
FERC authority over the rates for wholesale power 
sales in interstate commerce.  16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1); 
Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U.S. 
953, 966 (1986) (“FERC clearly has exclusive 
jurisdiction over the rates to be charged . . . 
interstate wholesale customers.”).  Section 205 
mandates that all jurisdictional rates be just and 
reasonable.  16 U.S.C. § 824d.  This includes actual 
jurisdictional rates and “classifications, practices, 
and regulations affecting such rates and charges.” Id. 
§ 824d(c). Section 206 of the FPA further obligates 
FERC to fix “just and reasonable” rates whenever it 
finds that any “practices . . . affecting” jurisdictional 
rates make such rates unjust or unreasonable.  Id. § 
824e.  Regulating compensation rates in wholesale 
markets, then, falls squarely within FERC’s 
authority. 
 
Importantly, in Order 745 FERC did not 
regulate DR as a “sale” under § 201.  Instead, FERC 
relied on its remedial authority under §§ 205 and 206 
as the basis for its Order 745 jurisdiction.  Order 745 
¶ 112.  Yet the D.C. Circuit failed to give effect to §§ 
205 and 206, stripping it of nearly all its meaning.2 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 An expansive reading of the opinion below suggests the court 
held that any FERC regulation of DR on the wholesale markets 
is foreclosed.  This issue was decided by FERC in Order 719; 
the time for challenging that determination has long since 
	  	  
6	  
	  
Instead, the court substituted its own judgment for 
that of FERC and reviewed the agency action based 
on a hypothetical, limitless menu of what FERC 
might have done, rather than on the substantial 
record that FERC actually developed.  Cf. SEC v. 
Chenery (Chenery I), 318 U.S. 80, 93-94 (1943) 
(agency’s “action must be measured by what [it] did, 
not by what it might have done”). 
 
B. FERC’s Remedial Authority 
Extends to Jurisdictional Practices 
Affecting Wholesale Rates, Even if 
Those Practices Also Impact Retail 
Rates.   
 
This Court has long held that §§ 205 and 206 
confer on FERC jurisdiction to regulate “practices . . . 
affecting” wholesale rates, even when the agency’s 
actions also impact retail customers. See, e.g., FPC v. 
Conway Corp., 426 U.S. 271, 276-80 (1976) (rejecting 
FERC’s determination that § 206 did not permit it to 
consider the impact on retail rates in setting just and 
reasonable wholesale rates); Miss. Power & Light Co. 
v. Mississippi, 487 U.S. 354, 363-64, 372 (1988) 
(recognizing FERC remedial jurisdiction over the 
terms of agreements to integrate power supply 
resources between utilities, even though FERC does 
not itself have jurisdiction over the affected 
generation assets).3  Indeed, in upholding Order No. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
passed.  See Wholesale Competition in Regions with Organized 
Electric Markets, 73 Fed. Reg. ¶ 64,100 (Oct. 28, 2008) 
[hereinafter Order 719]. 
3  As this Court implicitly recognized in discussing similar 
language of section 1(b) of the NGA, FERC may regulate 
wholesale sales even when those sales also relate to retail sales.  
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888’s industry-wide electric power restructuring 
initiative, this Court observed “[w]ere FERC to 
investigate this alleged discrimination [regarding 
unbundled retail transmission] and make findings 
concerning undue discrimination,” § 206 “would 
require FERC to provide a remedy for that 
discrimination”—even though such a remedy could 
also extend into retail aspects of bundled 
transmission.  New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. at 27 
(2002).  
 
Without question, the wholesale markets often 
affect retail markets.  But incidental effects on retail 
markets cannot bar FERC from regulating wholesale 
markets.  This Court has recognized this principle 
numerous times.  E.g., Conway Corp., 426 U.S. at 
278-79; Miss. Power & Light, 487 U.S. at 371-72.  
The determinant of FERC’s authority is whether 
“practices . . . affecting” the wholesale markets cause 
wholesale rates to be unjust and unreasonable.  
Under the FPA, the fact of a relationship to retail 
markets simply does not affect FERC’s jurisdiction. 
In concluding otherwise, the D.C. Circuit relied on a 
flawed reading of § 201. Nothing in the FPA supports 
the D.C. Circuit’s reading of the statutory scheme to 
bar FERC from regulating DR because it affects 
retail markets.    
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
See ONEOK, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591, 1603 (2015); 
see also id. at 1605 (stating FERC may regulate “with an eye 
toward blunting the sales’ anticompetitive effects in the retail 
market—even though retail prices are controlled by the 
States.”) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing FPC v. Conway Corp., 
426 U. S. at 276–80). 
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Lower courts have recognized this as well.  
The D.C. Circuit has previously held that FERC has 
§ 206 authority to approve rules related to power 
capacity, even though the rules affected state 
decisions about power generation facilities, which 
FERC cannot directly regulate.  Conn. Dep’t of Pub. 
Util. Control v. FERC, 569 F.3d 477, 479 (2009), cert. 
denied, 558 U.S. 1110 (2010).  FERC’s § 206 
authority also extends to requiring power 
transmission planning and cost allocation methods 
where the agency demonstrated that transmission 
owners were discriminating in providing access to 
those systems, notwithstanding traditional state 
authority over transmission siting.  S.C. Pub. Serv. 
Auth. v. FERC, 762 F.3d 41 (D.C. Cir. 2014); see also 
Joel B. Eisen, Who Regulates the Smart Grid?: 
FERC’s Authority over Demand Response 
Compensation in Wholesale Electricity Markets, 4 
SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 69, 95 (2012-
2013) (“This authority to regulate in mixed 
jurisdictional settings alone supports upholding 
Order 745.”).   
 
The D.C. Circuit agreed with FERC that DR 
“compensation affects the wholesale market.”  753 
F.3d at 221.  Indeed, the court emphasized that how 
DR is compensated will impact wholesale prices and 
bears on system reliability.  Id.  But it failed to give 
deference to FERC’s determination that these and 
other reasons brought the facts within FERC’s 
jurisdiction.  Cf. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural 
Resources Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984) 
(providing reasons for deferring to agency 
interpretations).  Instead, the D.C. Circuit fixated on 
its reading of the FPA as containing no limiting 
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principle, thereby ignoring FERC’s own reasoning, 
the text and history of the FPA, and over a century of 
precedent supplying limiting principles.  
 
C. FERC Reasonably Concluded It 
Had Jurisdiction Because DR 
Directly Affects the Proper 
Functioning of the Wholesale 
Markets. 
 
 
The D.C. Circuit improperly attempted to 
supply a new limiting principle for FERC’s 
jurisdiction.  But the FPA itself—and a large body of 
case law interpreting it and similar statutory 
language—provide the relevant limiting principles 
while supporting FERC’s jurisdiction over DR rules 
here. In short, “practices . . . affecting” jurisdiction 
attaches for practices that are directly related or 
integral to the proper functioning of the wholesale 
markets.   
 
The operative statutory language, “practices 
…affecting,” is meant to permit regulatory flexibility 
in addressing unjust, unreasonable and 
discriminatory operation of the wholesale market.  
The surrounding statutory text requires a connection 
to jurisdictional rates.  16 U.S.C. §§ 824d(a); 824e(a).  
Courts have never held that these terms are frozen 
into a static meaning; rather, courts have developed 
over a century of case law delineating jurisdictional 
lines and adapting to market realities.   
 
Remedial authority like that in §§ 205 and 206 
has been the subject of decades of judicial decisions 
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that draw jurisdictional lines for rate-setting 
agencies in the context of many of the regulatory 
statutes that are analogous to the FPA.  Initially, 
agencies applied the language to direct 
discrimination—for example, railroads’ secret 
customer preferences.  New York, New Haven & 
Hartford R.R. v. ICC, 200 U.S. 361, 391 (1906) 
(interpreting Interstate Commerce Act).  Later, the 
focal point for defining “practices” was often whether 
an aspect of a utility’s operation should have been 
disclosed in a rate-setting tariff.  Village of Winnetka 
v. FERC, 678 F.2d 354, 357 (D.C. Cir. 1982).  As this 
Court has recognized, when markets are partially 
deregulated, “practices” has come to encompass the 
rules of market operation more generally.  Global 
Crossing Telecomms., Inc. v. Metrophones 
Telecomms., Inc., 550 U.S. 45, 56-58 (2007) 
(interpreting Communications Act).   
 
The same is true for the FPA.  With the 
diminishing prominence of utility-specific tariffs, 
FERC’s role has shifted from overseeing whether an 
individual firm’s action is an unjust, unreasonable, 
or discriminatory practice, to whether features of the 
wholesale markets’ operation contribute to this 
effect.4  See generally Morgan Stanley Capital Group, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4  Prior to restructuring, demand response was not 
independently valued or priced but, to the extent it was 
reflected in interstate markets, it was provided as a part of a 
bundled wholesale transaction, which FERC would have 
regulated as a sale under Section 201(b)(1) of the FPA. The D.C. 
Circuit opinion suggests that FERC lost its jurisdiction over 
demand response with restructuring. As Justice Thomas 
observed in his dissent in New York v. FERC, to suggest that 
the very act of market restructuring somehow changed the 
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Inc. v. Pub. Utility Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish Cnty., 
554 U.S. 527 (2008) (noting how with restructuring 
FERC continues to police conditions such as market 
power, even though individual contracts no longer 
need to be filed with FERC); New York v. FERC, 535 
U.S. 1 (upholding FERC’s § 206 efforts to implement 
unbundling in wholesale power markets, based in 
part on agency’s finding of discrimination in bulk 
power supply markets); Joseph D. Kearney & 
Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of 
Regulated Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323 
(1998) (documenting such shifts in regulated 
industries generally).          
 
In addition to the requirement that “practices” 
must “affect” wholesale markets, courts have limited 
the kinds of practices to those that affect the 
wholesale markets directly or are integral to the 
proper functioning of the wholesale markets.  This 
Court has applied this limiting principle to multiple 
similar statutory schemes.  Under the Natural Gas 
Act (NGA), which is read in pari materia with the 
FPA, Ky. Util. Co. v. FERC, 760 F.2d 1321, 1325 n.6 
(D.C. Cir. 1985), this Court has emphasized that 
jurisdiction requires a direct connection to such 
rates.  See Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 
U.S. 293, 301 (1988) (“a natural gas company’s 
capital structure is related directly to the rates FERC 
allows it to charge”) (emphasis added); N. Natural 
Gas Co. v. State Corp. Comm’n of Kan., 372 U.S. 84, 
92 (1963) (FPC has “authority to regulate the 
intricate relationship between the purchasers’ cost 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
jurisdictional lines in the FPA is a distinction that “belie[s] the 
statutory text.”  535 U.S. at 41-42 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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structure and eventual costs to wholesale customers 
who sell to consumers in other States”) (emphasis 
added).  And this Court has held that similar 
language in the ICA requires that a practice must be 
“connected with the fixing of rates to be charged and 
prescribing of service to be rendered,” and therefore 
does not extend to a carrier’s employment decisions.  
Mo. Pac. R.R. v. Norwood, 283 U.S. 249, 257, 
modified, 283 U.S. 809 (1931) (internal quotations 
omitted); see also United States v. Pa. R.R. Co., 242 
U.S. 208 (1916) (holding that a railroad could not be 
forced by federal regulators to purchase equipment 
to serve its customers). 
 
The D.C. Circuit’s prior opinions recognize the 
limits on FERC’s authority under §§ 205 and 206.  As 
explained by then-Judge Scalia concerning what 
must be disclosed in compliance filings under the 
FPA, 
 
[T]here is an infinitude of 
practices affecting rates and service.  
The statutory directive must reasonably 
be read to require the [tariff disclosure] 
of only those practices that affect rates 
and services significantly, . . .  It is 
obviously left to the Commission, within 
broad bounds of discretion, to give 
concrete application to this amorphous 
directive. 
 
City of Cleveland v. FERC, 773 F.2d 1368, 1376 (D.C. 
Cir. 1985) (emphasis in original); see also Pub. Serv. 
Comm’n of N.Y. v. FERC, 813 F.2d 448 (D.C. Cir. 
1987) (utilities need not file practices dealing only 
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with matters of “practical insignificance” to serving 
customers).  Although firm-specific tariffs like those 
in City of Cleveland have given way to market-based 
rates, the requirement of directness has remained a 
limiting principle.  Cf. Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator 
Corp. v. FERC, 372 F.3d 395, 403 (D.C. Cir. 2004) 
(rejecting FERC authority to determine California 
ISO’s method of selecting board of directors as too 
remote and not “directly” or “closely” related to 
rates); Am. Gas Ass’n v. FERC, 912 F.2d 1496, 1506 
(D.C. Cir. 1990) (“Contracts that ‘affect’ a rate 
indirectly, merely because affecting the costs that 
determine what pipeline sales rates are permissible 
under the NGA’s ‘just and reasonable’ standard, are 
beyond [the NGA’s] reach.”).  
 
Given that §§ 205 and 206 cabin FERC’s 
jurisdiction, the D.C. Circuit’s use of far-fetched 
hypotheticals—applied in an attempt to illustrate 
the allegedly boundless scope of FERC jurisdiction—
is wide of the mark.  In response to the D.C. Circuit’s 
creative analogies, Amici contend that FERC cannot 
regulate steel, labor, broccoli, microwave ovens, or 
hot dogs because practices involving those subjects 
would not have a direct and significant effect on 
wholesale rates. But as the D.C. Circuit 
acknowledged, FERC compiled a lengthy record in 
which it supported its reasonable determination that 
DR practices directly affect wholesale rates, system 
reliability, and the supply and pricing of energy at 
wholesale. Practices involving steel, labor, broccoli, 
microwaves and hot dogs simply do not have this 
kind of direct and significant effect on interstate 
power markets.  Whether or not one agrees with 
FERC’s means for remedying unjust and 
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unreasonable market conditions, its jurisdiction here 
fits squarely within its remedial authority. 
 
II. The D.C. Circuit Also Erred In 
Interpreting the FPA to Give States 
Exclusive Authority Over Demand 
Response 
 
In addition to ignoring the case law that 
supports FERC jurisdiction over DR, the D.C. Circuit 
used a flawed interpretation of FERC’s authority, 
based on what it deemed “direct regulation of the 
retail market—a matter exclusively within state 
control.” 753 F.3d at 224. In taking this 
unprecedented step, the D.C. Circuit announced a 
novel interpretation of § 201(a). That section states 
that FERC’s reach “extend[s] only to those matters 
which are not subject to regulation by the States.” 16 
U.S.C. § 824(a).  If allowed to stand, the D.C. 
Circuit’s effort to rewrite the FPA to contain an 
exclusive jurisdictional sphere for any activity a 
state regulates will threaten established FERC 
market initiatives far beyond DR.   
 
This jurisdictional limit has no basis in the 
text or structure of the FPA. From its earliest 
decisions interpreting the FPA, this Court has 
consistently recognized the language of section 
201(a) is a “mere ‘policy declaration’” to help courts 
in addressing conflicts between federal and state 
authority under the statute—language that “‘cannot 
nullify a clear and specific grant of jurisdiction . . . .’” 
New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. at 22 (quoting FPC v. S. 
Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205, 215 (1964); Conn. 
Light & Power Co. v. FPC, 324 U.S. 515, 527 (1945)). 
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To Amici’s knowledge, no previous decision of this 
Court or of the D.C. Circuit has held that the general 
language in § 201(a) carves out a field for “exclusive” 
state regulation.  Cf. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. 
v. FPC, 319 U.S. 61, 74-77 (1943) (rejecting § 201(a) 
as a limit on express authority elsewhere in FPA); 
Duke Power Co. v. FPC, 401 F.2d 930, 938 (D.C. Cir. 
1968) (§ 201(a) “is not a limitation on the 
Commission’s exercise of a clear and specific grant of 
jurisdiction”). 
 
Treating § 201(a) as a policy declaration 
(consistent with this Court’s past decisions) does not 
render this language a nullity. Instead, this 
language provides guidance for considering the 
interests of states in those situations where actual 
jurisdictional conflicts arise—typically, in 
preemption disputes. Cf. New York v. FERC, 535 
U.S. at 19 (reasoning that the jurisdictional 
challenge to Order No. 888 does not invoke any kind 
of presumption against preemption “because the 
question presented does not concern the validity of a 
conflicting state law of regulation.”). By reading § 
201(a) as a jurisdictional savings clause that 
preserves “exclusive” state authority, the D.C. 
Circuit does violence to the FPA’s structure. Had 
Congress wanted to give states all jurisdiction over 
activities that directly affect the retail market, it 
knew how to say so.  Cf. 16 U.S.C. § 824(b) (expressly 
providing that FERC lacks jurisdiction over 
electricity generation facilities, among other things).  
The statute simply does not do this in § 201(a). 
 
Moreover, the D.C. Circuit has failed to 
identify any actual jurisdictional conflicts between 
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the federal government and the states, or any 
conflicts between state and federal regulatory 
programs.  Because it has prematurely hypothesized 
a conflict with states where no actual dispute exists, 
the D.C. Circuit’s erroneous interpretation of FERC's 
jurisdiction is more dangerous than it first appears. 
For example, it could call into question the validity of 
this Court’s past decisions regarding the 
circumstances in which it is appropriate for state 
regulators to pass through federally-approved 
wholesale rates. Nantahala, 476 U.S. at 972 (noting 
that filed rate doctrine principles preclude state 
regulators from ignoring FERC’s determinations 
affecting the cost of wholesale power when they set 
retail rates).  Those decisions preserve a state 
regulatory role in assessing the prudency of specific 
purchases.  Id. at 972 (suggesting that “a particular 
quantity of power from a particular source could be 
deemed excessive [by state regulators] if lower cost 
power is available elsewhere, even if the higher cost 
power actually purchased is obtained at a FERC-
approved, and therefore reasonable, price.”) 
(emphasis in original).  FERC’s adoption of DR 
valuation rules in the wholesale market does not 
interfere with this state ratemaking role. If a state 
were to claim that FERC’s compensation rules 
conflict with actual state retail ratemaking, the 
proper way to address this would be through a case-
by-case preemption challenge under the filed rate 
doctrine.  See Jim Rossi, Lowering the Filed Tariff 
Shield:  Judicial Enforcement for a Deregulatory Era, 
56 VAND. L. REV. 1591, 1642-46 (2003). 
 
Apparently recognizing that Order 745 creates 
no real conflict with state regulation, the D.C. 
	  	  
17	  
	  
Circuit stretches to invent one. It reasons that 
FERC’s DR payments will “lure” retail customers 
into wholesale markets. 753 F.3d at 223. Yet FERC’s 
jurisdiction over power markets is not based on the 
choices of private firms.  Wholesale power market 
prices routinely impact retail customers’ cost and 
benefit calculations, and thereby affect private firms’ 
operational and investment decisions. This may 
impact the behaviors of market participants, whose 
choices may trigger federal jurisdiction, but these 
private decisions do not change the types of activities 
over which FERC has jurisdiction under the FPA. 
For example, a large industrial customer might take 
advantage of high prices to forgo consuming power it 
self-generates, choosing instead to sell the power into 
wholesale markets. Such a change in the firm’s 
behavior might subject a transaction to FERC 
jurisdiction even though the firm’s previous 
generation decisions were not regulated by FERC.  
But the private, voluntary transactions of private 
market participants have nothing to do with whether 
§ 201(a) preserves exclusive jurisdiction for states 
over demand response, and do not support the D.C. 
Circuit’s conclusion to the contrary.   
 
Thus, the D.C. Circuit erred when it 
interpreted § 201(a) of the FPA to have a meaning 
that Congress did not express.  Section 201(a)’s 
policy declaration does not define any exclusive field 
for state regulation of anything that affects retail 
customers.  
 
III. The D.C. Circuit’s Decision Is 
Contrary to Congress’s Plain Design 
for Energy Regulation. 
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The D.C. Circuit’s erroneous reading of 
FERC’s remedial authority, premised on its faulty 
construction of § 201(a), would create a glaring gap 
in jurisdiction to regulate wholesale markets.  As 
FERC found in Order 745, if DR is not consistently 
and properly valued in interstate markets, a variety 
of dysfunctions are likely to arise in wholesale 
markets.  The practices of market participants with 
respect to DR and the impacts of those practices on 
the rates for power sales cannot be regulated by the 
states because they are interstate in nature.  If the 
valuation of DR by participants in interstate markets 
is not subject to some federal regulatory oversight, 
there would be precisely the kind of regulatory gap 
that Congress sought to correct when it adopted the 
FPA in 1935.  Sections 205 and 206 must be 
understood in light of this purpose:  the FPA closes 
the Attleboro gap by ensuring that FERC may 
regulate when states cannot.  New York v. FERC, 
535 U.S. at 6. 
 
The D.C. Circuit’s reading of the FPA is 
inconsistent with this Court’s recognition that “[t]he 
FPA authorized federal regulation not only of 
wholesale sales that had been beyond the reach of 
state power, but also the regulation of wholesale 
sales that had been previously subject to state 
regulation.”  New York, 535 U.S. at 21. The FPA did 
not retain the jurisdictional boundaries that existed 
in 1935, or suggest that only states would have 
authority over new market activities such as DR.  
See id. (upholding FERC jurisdiction over unbundled 
sales of transmission notwithstanding that “in 1935, 
there was neither state nor federal regulation of 
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what did not exist”). The D.C. Circuit’s erroneous 
interpretations of FERC’s jurisdiction would be likely 
to lead to other regulatory gaps in restructured 
electric power markets.  Under that court’s 
reasoning, FERC’s ability to regulate other activities 
in wholesale power markets, such as frequency 
regulation and battery storage, would also be called 
into question, even though those practices have 
direct and significant effects on wholesale rates.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons stated above, Amici urge this 
Court to reject the D.C. Circuit’s erroneous holding 
that FERC lacks jurisdiction over the market 
valuation of demand response in competitive 
interstate wholesale power markets.   
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